вЂњSo we built a model in which we abstracted away from many complexities of the policymaking process but preserved the feature most relevant for us: the fact that many policies have a long-term nature but need to be revised periodically to respond to economic shocks. вЂњPolicymaking is very complex, and it is hard to analyze as a whole, but we were curious about whether the nature of long-term legislation itself had any effect on polarization,вЂќ Dziuda says. This takes place even when politicians personally hold similar points of view. The researchersвЂ™ analysis further shows that the desire to maintain the equilibrium is driven by a vicious cycle in which polarization and disagreement feed on each other so that the desire not to change legislation becomes increasingly strong and can lead to complete gridlock. More conservative members will oppose tax increases, and more liberal members will oppose tax decreases вЂ“ even when such changes would benefit the economy. These fears and considerations make politicians vote in a more polarized manner. So instead the conservatives may decide to vote against todayвЂ™s tax increase and maintain the status quo because they are worried they wonвЂ™t be able to reverse such actions in the future. But to do that, they will require an agreement with the more liberal party, which may be difficult in the long term. If the economy becomes stronger, members of the more conservative party may want to lower taxes. But since the higher taxes will continue by default even if the economy improves, more conservative legislators may worry that the higher taxes will become the new status quo. For example, if there is a proposal to raise taxes to pay off the deficit, many members of Congress could find such a proposal beneficial. Thus if a law is passed, it is usually expected to continue until another piece of legislation alters it. However, most legislation in the United States is ongoing. Once the bridge is built, the funding winds down. The first is short-term, such as when a legislature OKs funds to build a bridge. As the researchers explain, there are two kinds of legislation.

In вЂњDynamic Choice with Endogenous Status Quo,вЂќ Dziuda and her coauthor, Antoine Loeper of the Universidad Carlos II de Madrid, note that policymakersвЂ™ knowledge that new legislation could carry on indefinitely makes them worry. Naturally, there are many reasons for maintaining the status quo on tax policy, but in her latest paper, Assistant Professor Wioletta Dziuda suggests that the long-term nature of most American legislation may be partially responsible for congressional inaction on important issues. Yet in all this time, no such change has taken place, and in fact no serious plan has ever been brought to a vote.

For decades, politicians on both sides of the aisle have been calling for a simplification of the Internal Revenue Code, which would make both the payment and the collection of taxes easier and more comprehensive.

Political gridlock occurs when